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ABSTRACT 
During the nineteenth century, legislatures proved “excessively generous” in 
granting railroad corporations property rights in publicly owned, commercially vital 
municipal streets and harbors. Jacksonian jurists, suspicious of corporate influence, 
invoked the public trust doctrine to rescind grants of privilege inconsistent with the 
public interest. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the “lodestar” of the modern 
doctrine, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the Illinois legislature’s authority to 
convey the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor to a railroad corporation, a 
conveyance that empowered a private enterprise to “practically control . . . for its own 
profit” a publicly owned “highway” vital to Chicago’s “vast and constantly increasing 
commerce.” 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, courts seized on Illinois Central as a 
useful tool for protecting environmentally sensitive waterways while generally ignoring a 
century of caselaw applying the public trust doctrine to non-submerged infrastructure, 
namely municipal streets. The latent potential of the doctrine to protect public 
infrastructure from corporate monopolization remains relevant because private investors 
are increasingly pursuing property rights in such assets. A prominent example is the 
Chicago parking meter privatization, conveying to a Morgan Stanley subsidiary the 
rights to all on-street parking meter revenues for seventy-five years. 
This Note analyzes the Chicago parking meter privatization under Illinois Central, 
and subsequent Illinois public trust caselaw, and concludes that the agreement represents 
precisely the sort of conveyance the Illinois Central Court sought to proscribe, namely, 
one that sacrifices public “management and control”1 of a highway “for commerce, 
trade, and intercourse”2 essential to Chicago’s continued economic and urban 
development. In the absence of judicial intervention, shortsighted state and local 
governments will continue to succumb to the temptation of selling rights in vital public 
infrastructure for temporary, short-term profit, in opaque, potentially corrupt 
transactions, sacrificing the ability of future generations to regulate as public necessity, 
safety, and welfare require. 
                                                            
* Juris Doctor, 2012, Northwestern University School of Law. He wishes to thank Professor Michael Barsa 
for his encouragement and the editors of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their 
guidance.  
1 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). 
2 Id. at 528. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the nineteenth century, railroad corporations fought aggressively to acquire 
property rights in the public streets and harbors of America’s burgeoning metropolises.3 
Legislators, whether shortsighted, incompetent, or corrupt, proved “excessive[ly] 
generous” in granting private parties rights in such assets.4 Responsibility for protecting 
the jus publicum, or public interest, thus devolved to the courts, which invoked the 
concept of the public trust to invalidate grants of invaluable public property. Most 
prominently, in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, the “lodestar” of modern 
public trust jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Lake Front 
Act of 1869, conveying the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor to the Illinois Central 
Railroad.5 Though the legislature sought to protect the public interest by significantly 
conditioning the grant and extracting substantial consideration from the railroad, the 
Court found the legislature exceeded its authority by abdicating “management and 
control”6 over a publicly owned asset essential to the city’s “vast and constantly 
increasing commerce.”7 Concurrently, courts of final appeal in New England and Mid-
Atlantic and Southern states, employing public trust principles, found that their 
legislatures exceeded their constitutional authorities by conveying property rights in 
commercially vital municipal streets to private, for-profit railroads.8 The public trust 
doctrine, as conceived in Illinois Central and applied by late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century courts, thus proscribed “what today would be called rent-seeking 
behavior: a small, well-organized private interest procur[ing] legislation that gave it 
monopoly privileges in order to extract wealth from the diffuse and unrepresented 
public.”9 
Today, the doctrine is virtually unrecognizable from this early conception. In 1970, 
Professor Joseph Sax published a transformative law review article in which he argued, 
“Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have 
                                                            
3 See MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY, 1789–1920 107–16 (Harold Hyman et al. eds., 1987); see also Joseph D. 
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really 
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004) (detailing the efforts of the Illinois Central 
Railroad Company to acquire the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor).  
4 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970); see also Selvin, supra note 3, at 107–16.  
5 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387; see, e.g., Sax, supra note 4, at 489 (describing Illinois Central as the 
“lodestar” American public trust decision, a description that has been explicitly adopted by various courts); 
see also Owsichek v. State Guide, Licensing, and Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 496 (Alaska 1988) (citing the 
“lodestar of American public trust law, Illinois Central”); Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d. 1025, 1027 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1984) (noting that the “lodestar” of the public trust doctrine in American law is Illinois Central); 
City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980) (describing Illinois 
Central as a seminal case); In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 440 (Haw. 
2000) (describing Illinois Central as a seminal case); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 
Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983) (describing Illinois Central as a seminal case). 
6 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453. 
7 Id. at 454. 
8 See, e.g., Story v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 90 N.Y. 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882); Lahr v. Metro. Elevated Ry. 
Co., 10 N.E. 528 (N.Y. 1887); Pa. R.R. Co. v. Miller, 132 U.S. 75 (1889); Jones v. Erie and Wyo. Valley 
R.R. Co., 25 A. 134 (Pa. 1892); Griffin v. Shreveport and Ark. RR. Co., 6 So. 624 (La. 1889); Costigan v. 
Pa. R.R. Co., 23 A. 810 (N.J. 1892). 
9 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 805. 
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the breadth and substantive content that might make it useful as a tool . . . [for addressing 
natural] resource management problems.”10 In the decades since, courts have proved 
receptive to this charge, overwhelmingly construing the doctrine as natural resources 
law.11 Whereas Illinois Central sought to protect a navigable, commercially vital, 
municipal harbor from corporate monopolization, courts have since expanded the 
doctrine to encompass commercially insignificant, nonnavigable waterways, and 
environmental, scenic, and recreational interests.12 In thus construing the doctrine, courts 
have generally ignored, without specifically rejecting, a body of caselaw, beginning in 
the mid-nineteenth century and continuing into the twentieth, invoking the doctrine to 
protect the public character of municipal streets.13  
The latent potential of the doctrine to proscribe economically destructive or 
monopolistic control of vital public infrastructure, as demonstrated in Illinois Central, 
remains relevant because “small, well-organized private [parties]” are increasingly 
pursuing ownership interests in public streets, highways, and harbors:  
Reeling from more exotic investments that imploded during the credit 
crisis, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, the Carlyle Group, Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse are among the investors who have 
amassed an estimated $250 billion war chest—much of it raised in the last 
two years—to finance a tidal wave of infrastructure projects in the United 
States and overseas.14  
[B]anks and private investment firms have fallen in love with public 
infrastructure. They're smitten by the rich cash flows that roads, bridges, 
airports, parking garages, and shipping ports generate—and the 
monopolistic advantages that keep those cash flows as steady as a beating 
heart.15 
While the private sector scours for infrastructure investments, states and 
municipalities struggle to balance budgets ravaged by “the steepest decline in state tax 
                                                            
10 See Sax, supra note 4, at 474, 489–90 (arguing Illinois Central contains “the central substantive thought” 
of public trust litigation). 
11 See generally THOMAS MERRILL & HENRY SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 332 (2007); 
CHRISTINE KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 
618 (2nd ed. 2009).  
12 See, e.g., KLEIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 618–78.  
13 See infra text accompanying note 150. 
14 Jenny Anderson, Cities Debate Privatizing Public Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008, 
www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/business/27fund.html.  
15 Emily Thornton, Roads To Riches: Why Investors Are Clamoring to Take Over America's Highways, 
Bridges, and Airports—And Why the Public Should Be Nervous, BUSINESSWEEK, May 7, 2007, 
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_19/b4033001.htm. In such transactions, the private investor 
pays the owner, whether a state, municipality, or other public entity, a single, upfront fee, which amounts to 
essentially the asset’s sale price. In return, the state forfeits its rights to revenues derived from the publicly 
owned, now encumbered asset, and agrees to compensate the investor for actions that impair its 
profitability. Such investments differ markedly from mere operating agreements in which the state 
outsources a traditionally public service to a private concessionaire. In such transactions, the state pays the 
private party, not vice-versa; retaining the concessionaire only for his services, the state maintains 
regulatory control over the publicly owned property. Conversely, in infrastructure investment transactions, 
the investor, as de facto owner, generally hires his own concessionaire to operate and maintain the asset.  
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receipts on record.”16 In the wake of the financial crisis, “[s]tates will continue to struggle 
to find the revenue needed to support critical public services . . . for a number of years.”17 
Amidst such uncertainty, the municipal bond market has demanded substantial premiums 
for accepting the risk of lending to struggling state and local governments, exacerbating 
their precarious financial positions. In fact, the crisis is motivating speculation of an 
impending “tsunami of municipal bankruptcies and defaults.”18 As a consequence, states 
and municipal governments confront the overwhelming temptation of entering into 
privatization agreements with Wall Street institutions “in order to receive large, upfront 
payments that solve short-term financial problems . . . .”19 Ironically, the financial crisis 
that precipitated these unprecedented reductions in tax revenues, motivating states and 
municipalities to explore infrastructure privatization, was “caused by widespread failures 
in government regulation, corporate mismanagement and heedless risk-taking by Wall 
Street.”20 
Under Mayor Richard Daley, the City of Chicago pioneered municipal 
infrastructure privatization.21 In 2005, the city leased the Chicago Skyway, a 7.8-mile 
city-owned expressway, for ninety-nine years to private investors for $1.83 billion.22 In 
2006, the city leased four city-owned parking garages, partially beneath public streets, for 
ninety-nine years to Morgan Stanley for $563 million.23 In 2008, the City Council 
approved a ninety-nine year lease of city-owned Midway Airport to a private consortium 
for $2.5 billion.24 
Most recently, the city entered into a seventy-five-year non-possessory lease and 
license conveying an exclusive right to revenues from 36,161 city-owned on-street 
                                                            
16 Nicholas Johnson et al., State Tax Changes in Response to the Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET POLICIES & 
PRIORITIES (Mar. 8, 2010), www.cbpp.org/files/3-8-10sfp.pdf.  
17 Elizabeth McNichol et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET POLICIES & 
PRIORITIES (Feb. 11, 2011), www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=711.  
18 See, e.g., David Wessel, Local Debts Defy Easy Solution, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704814204575507842266619222.html (acknowledging, 
but ultimately dismissing, such predictions).  
19 Report of Inspector General’s Findings and Recommendations: An Analysis of the Lease of the City’s 
Parking Meters, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, 2 (June 2, 2009), 
www.chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/pdf/IGO-CMPS-20090602.pdf [hereinafter Report of Inspector 
General]. 
20 Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html. 
21 See, e.g., Mick Dumke, Mayor Daley Pitches Chicago in Asia, but Who Is Buying?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
13, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/us/14cncpulse.html. In fact, the former chief financial officer for 
the City of Chicago, Dana R. Levenson, is “one of the movement’s biggest champions.” Thornton, supra 
note 15. Prior to serving as Chicago’s CFO, he worked as an investment banker for Banc One and Bank of 
America. Upon leaving the city’s employ, he accepted a position as a managing director for Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group, where “he now beats the bushes for infrastructure deals.” Id. 
22 Richard M. Daley’s 22 Years as Mayor, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2011, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-daley-timeline-special-
section20110430,0,870437.story?page=1. 
23 Yvette Shields, Chicago Approves Garage Deal: $563M Lease Sparks Threat of Injunction, THE BOND 
BUYER, Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-258093-1.html. 
24 Paul Merrion, Midway Airport Privatization in Holding Pattern, CHI. BUS., Feb. 1, 2010, 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20100201/NEWS02/200036929. While the city council approved 
the transaction, the buyer’s financing collapsed in the wake of the financial crisis, and thus, the airport 
remains under municipal control. Id. 
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metered parking and garage spaces to Chicago Parking Meters, LLC, a subsidiary of 
investment bank Morgan Stanley.25 In return, the city received a single, upfront payment 
of $1.15 billion.26 The grant, codified in the Chicago Parking Meter System Concession 
Agreement (“Concession Agreement”),27 requires the city to compensate Morgan Stanley 
for “any action or actions at any time” which materially affect the market value of 
Morgan Stanley’s interest, including the exercise of the city’s “reserved powers” to 
regulate the public rights-of-way as public necessity, safety, and welfare require.28  
At the time of its enactment, the Chicago Parking Meter privatization was 
unprecedented among U.S. cities. In the fall of 2010, however, the Indianapolis City 
Council approved a fifty year, $620 million lease of the city’s parking meters to private 
investors.29 Recently, New York City solicited parking meter privatization proposals 
                                                            
25 See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHIC., ILL., Dec. 4, 2008, 
www.chicityclerk.com/journals/2008/dec4_2008/120408_SP.pdf [hereinafter J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY 
COUNCIL]. The agreement conveyed a grant from the city for the right to “operate, maintain and improve 
the Metered Parking System, [and] to retain the revenues to be derived from the operation of the 
Concession Metered Parking Spaces.” Id. at 50527. While the contract consists of both a “non-possessory 
lease” and a “license,” Morgan Stanley, in its own financial statements, refers to the Concession Agreement 
as a “lease.” Specifically, the 2009 audited financial statements state, “[Morgan Stanley] leased the System 
for a 75-year term from the City of Chicago . . . for a purchase price of $1,151,355,186.” Chicago Parking 
Meters, LLC, Financial Statements and Schedule, Feb. 28, 2010, at 6, available at 
www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/fin/supp_info/AssetLeaseAgreements/MeteredParking/Park
ingMetersLLCFinancialStatement2010.pdf. 
26 See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50508. 
27 Dan Mihalopoulos & Hal Dardick, Aldermen Approve Chicago Parking Meter Lease, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 4, 
2008, 11:45 AM), newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2008/12/aldermen-deba-1.html; see also J. OF 
THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50527.  
28 This proposition is derived from the Concession Agreement’s definition of: Adverse Action (“An 
‘Adverse Action’ shall occur if the City . . . takes any action or actions at any time during the Term 
(including enacting any Law) and the effect of such action or actions, individually or in the aggregate, is 
reasonably expected (i) to be principally borne by the Concessionaire or other operators of on-street 
metered parking systems and (ii) to have a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the 
Concessionaire Interest . . .”), J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50618–19; 
Compensation Event (“‘Compensation Event’ means . . . the occurrence of an Adverse Action or the 
occurrence of any other event that under the terms of this Agreement explicitly requires the payment of 
Concession Compensation”), Id. at 50533; Concession Compensation (“Concession Compensation’ means 
compensation payable by the City to the Concessionaire in order to restore the Concessionaire to same 
economic position the Concessionaire would have enjoyed if the applicable Compensation Event had not 
occurred”), id.; Reserved Powers (“‘Reserved Powers’ means the exercise by the City of . . . police and 
regulatory powers with respect to Metered Parking Spaces”), id. at 50549; and Reserved Powers Adverse 
Action Compensation (“[T]here may be circumstances when the exercise by the City of its Reserved 
Powers may have a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest . . . and 
that under such circumstances the Concessionaire may seek compensation with respect thereto (the 
‘Reserved Powers Adverse Action Compensation’)”), id. at 50621. For more complete definitions of these 
provisions, see infra Appendix.  
29 Caitlin Devitt, Indianapolis Plan to Lease City's Parking Meters Wins Approval, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 
2010, at 28. Also in fall 2010, the Pittsburgh City Council considered, but ultimately rejected, a $451 
million parking meter privatization proposed by investment bank J.P. Morgan. Kris B. Mamula, Pittsburgh 
Considers New Parking Plan, PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010, 
www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2010/12/28/pittsburgh-considers-new-parking-plan.html. 
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from investment banks, hoping to net $5 billion.30 Washington, D.C. is reportedly 
following suit.31 
This Note analyzes the Parking Meter Concession Agreement under the public trust 
doctrine, as articulated in Illinois Central and modern Illinois code and caselaw. Parts I 
and II review, respectively, the Illinois Central dispute and decision and the Concession 
Agreement’s substantive provisions and process of enactment. Part III analyzes the 
validity of the Concession Agreement under Illinois Central.32 On the surface, such an 
analysis may seem absurd; today, courts overwhelmingly apply Illinois Central to 
submerged lands, not municipal streets. To this end, subpart III(A) surveys the history of 
the doctrine in Roman, English, and early American law, demonstrating its historical 
application to municipal streets and placing the Court’s 1892 Illinois Central opinion in 
context. Subpart III(B) analyzes the language of the opinion for evidence of this history, 
demonstrating the Court contemplated a rule applicable not only to Chicago’s municipal 
harbor but to the city’s “streets, alleys, [and] ways.” Having established the Court-
considered municipal streets in Illinois public trust property, subpart III(C) analyzes the 
Concession Agreement under the rules governing the disposition of such property 
announced in Illinois Central, ultimately concluding that the conveyance violates the 
fundamental policy principles motivating the Court.  
In Part IV, the Note transitions from a discussion of Illinois Central to the practical 
application of the public trust doctrine to the Concession Agreement litigation. The 
analysis begins by noting that the Concession Agreement itself specifically acknowledges 
that the city administers Chicago’s public ways in accordance with the public trust 
doctrine.33 This provision is consistent with the Illinois Plat Act, which states that 
municipal streets are held in public trust.34 The analysis continues by applying modern 
Illinois public trust law to the Concession Agreement, including a 1993 decision in which 
the Illinois Supreme Court prohibited municipalities from exercising “proprietary 
powers” over public streets, “rent[ing] or leas[ing] parts, or all, of a public street,” or 
using “public streets [primarily] as revenue-producing property. . . .”35 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO ILLINOIS CENTRAL 
In his seminal article on the American public trust doctrine, Professor Joseph Sax 
writes that Illinois Central contains the “central substantive thought of public trust 
                                                            
30 See Andrew Grossman, City on the Prowl for Cash, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2011, at A17; David Seifman, 
City Mulls $5b Meter Sell-off, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, 
www.nypost.com/p/news/local/city_mulls_meter_sell_off_53FEAGOGzvBfxQuXDs5JZL.  
31 See Michael Neibauer, A New Direction for D.C.'s Parking Meters?, WASH. BUS. J., Dec. 14, 2010, 
www.bizjournals.com/washington/blog/2010/12/a-new-direction-for-dcs-parking.html.  
32 The public trust doctrine undoubtedly imposes prohibitions applicable to all states; nonetheless, the 
doctrine is generally construed as state law. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 11, at 323. (“Justice Field 
never says whether he is applying federal law or state law in Illinois Central. In subsequent public trust 
decisions, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the doctrine is grounded in state law . . . . 
[But] there have been recurrent attempts to argue that the trust is in fact grounded in federal law.”) Id. For 
the purposes of this Note, however, this discussion is irrelevant; regardless of whether Illinois Central 
applies federal or state law, the opinion is binding upon Illinois.  
33 See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50576. 
34 Plat Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/3 (West 2010). 
35 See AT&T Co. v. Arlington Heights, 620 N.E.2d 1040, 1049, 1044, 1047 (Ill. 1993). 
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litigation.”36 Likewise, Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill note in their 
influential study of Illinois Central, “[a]lthough proponents and detractors of the public 
trust doctrine dispute much, all agree that the leading case establishing the doctrine in the 
United States—the ‘lodestar’ of the modern public trust doctrine—is the United States 
Supreme Court’s 1892 decision in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois.”37 
A. Facts 
Reviewing the facts underlying the Illinois Central dispute is essential to 
understanding the Court’s Illinois Central decision because “the facts of the case—or at 
least highly stylized versions of them—have been repeatedly invoked in modern cases 
and commentary as a justification for the very existence of the public trust doctrine.”38 As 
presented by commentators, and as evidenced in Justice Field’s opinion, “Those facts 
assume the form of a classical cautionary tale: a corrupt, or at least exceedingly short-
sighted, legislature transferred invaluable natural resources to a small but influential 
interest group, with no identifiable benefit to the public at large.”39 As Professors Merrill 
and Kearny discovered in their investigation, however, this caricature lacks the nuance 
and complexity of reality.  
In 1869, the Illinois legislature enacted the Lake Front Act conveying to the Illinois 
Central Railroad the fee simple title to “something more than a thousand acres” of 
submerged lands within the Chicago Harbor40 and several acres of non-submerged land in 
north Lake Park,41 consisting of contemporary Millennium Park.42 In return, the Act 
required the railroad to remit $800,000 for north Lake Park and seven percent of gross 
receipts from any leases in the harbor in perpetuity for the submerged lands.43 In addition, 
the railroad agreed to build a breakwater, a capital-intensive infrastructure improvement 
beyond the city’s means.44  
The submerged lands conveyed in the Lake Front Act were undeveloped and idle. 
In 1869, the city’s bustling commercial port facilities were not in the Chicago Harbor, but 
on the Chicago River;45 the conveyance codified in the Act, however, excluded “the 
entirety of the existing harbor facilities located along the Chicago River.”46 Accordingly, 
“[t]he Lake Front Act did not create a giant monopoly” over the city’s commercial port 
facilities;47 rather, the Act empowered the Illinois Central Railroad to dictate, and 
potentially delay, development of a proposed port in the Chicago Harbor, which was 
intended to ease congestion on the Chicago River. The north Lake Park property 
conveyed by the Lake Front Act was equally idle; the property was “almost useless as a 
pleasure-ground. In fact its only public utility ha[d] been that of a dumping-place for 
                                                            
36 Joseph L. Sax, supra note 4, at 490.  
37 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 800.  
38 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 803.  
39 Id.  
40 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892). 
41 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 801.  
42 Id. at 900. 
43 Id. at 809 n.45. 
44 Id. at 819–20.  
45 Id. at 881.  
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
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cellar excavations, street-sweepings, coal-ashes and other refuse material.”48 Nonetheless, 
by virtue of its location, the property commanded a substantial price.49  
In selling the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor and the pleasure grounds of 
north Lake Park, the legislature sought to protect the public interest by reserving for the 
state specific rights in the conveyed properties. For instance, the Act provided “nothing 
herein contained shall authorize obstructions to the Chicago Harbor, or impair the public 
right of navigation,”50 significantly qualifying the railroad’s right to exclude. Moreover, 
the Act reserved for the state the right to regulate rates charged by Illinois Central 
Railroad for the use of harbor facilities,51 a reservation which effectively undermined 
Illinois Central’s ability to extract monopoly profits. Finally, the Act prohibited Illinois 
Central from granting, selling or conveying, in perpetuity, the submerged lands of the 
Chicago Harbor, further qualifying the railroad’s property rights.52 Such qualifications, 
intended to protect the state’s interests, motivated the Illinois Central dissent, which 
argued, “the Lake Front Act had prohibited the railroad from interfering with the public 
right of navigation and had preserved the power of the State to regulate the railroad’s 
construction of improvements in the harbor.”53  
Despite the legislature’s efforts to retain some semblance of regulatory control over 
the conveyed properties, the citizens of Chicago overwhelmingly opposed the Lake Front 
Act, popularly dubbed the “Lake Front Steal.”54 The Chicago Tribune, for instance, 
warned of invaluable public property “pass[ing] into the hands of a Wall [S]treet 
corporation.”55 Newspapers “saw the matter largely as a question of the adequacy of the 
consideration”56 and complained that the Lake Front Act granted “valuable property, with 
equally valuable privileges, for a merely nominal sum.”57 Echoing such concerns, 
Governor Palmer initially vetoed the Act, declaring: 
[T]he obligations of prudence and good faith require that the [north Lake 
Park] property shall not be sold for less than its full market value . . . [I 
am] assured by the highest authorities upon the subject of the value of real 
estate in the city of Chicago, that the property . . . offered . . . for the sum 
of eight hundred thousand dollars, has a market value of two million[], six 
hundred thousand dollars.58 
Further inflaming public opposition, the Act was subject to accusations of 
corruption.59 Indeed, the Court obliquely referenced the dubious legislative process 
                                                            
48 Id. at 845.  
49 See id. at 846–47. 
50 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 449 (1892). 
51 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 808. 
52 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 451 (stating that “[t]he grant is accompanied with a proviso that the fee of 
the lands shall be held by the company in perpetuity, and that it shall not have the power to grant, sell or 
convey the fee thereof”). 
53 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 921.  
54 Id. at 854.  
55 Id. at 861 (citing The Lake Park and Front Bills, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1869, at 2).  
56 Id. at 866. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 873.  
59 Id. at 887–92.  
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noting, “The circumstances attending the passage of the [A]ct through the legislature 
were on the hearing the subject of much criticism.”60 The accusations, however 
compelling, were never proven. On this question, Professors Kearny and Merrill 
concluded that, “although the documentary record from 1869 cannot be said definitely to 
establish that the Illinois Central used corrupt means to facilitate the enactment of the 
Lake Front Act, it probably leans in that direction.”61 Nonetheless, owing to the 
consideration provided by the railroad and the regulatory control retained by the state, it 
is “abundantly clear that many if not most of those voting for the Lake Front Act 
sincerely perceived it to be in the general interest.”62 
B. Holding 
In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the legitimacy of the 
Lake Front Act.63 First, the Court found that the state’s title to the Chicago Harbor was 
not absolute; rather, the state held such special lands in public trust.64 Surveying state and 
federal opinions, the Court divined the following common law rule: “[T]he bed or soil of 
navigable waters is held by the people of the state in their character as sovereign in trust 
for public uses for which they are adapted.”65 The Court distinguished public trust lands, 
alternately described as “property of a special character”66 or “property in which the 
whole people are interested,”67 from “public lands which are open to pre-emption and 
sale.”68 Second, applying the Plat Act, the Court found the legislature lacked authority to 
convey north Lake Park. “By a statute of Illinois,” the Court wrote, “the making, 
acknowledging and recording of the plats operated to vest the title to the streets, alleys, 
ways and commons, and other public grounds designated on such plats, in the city, in 
trust for the public uses to which they were applicable.”69 Strictly construing this Act, the 
Court concluded that the State lacked any title in north Lake Park to convey.  
Under the holding of Illinois Central, public trust lands are not inherently 
inalienable. Rather, such lands are alienable if the state retains management and control 
over the conveyed property or conveying the property serves the public interest. 
Specifically, the Court held: 
The trust devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be 
discharged by the management and control of property in which the public 
has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The 
control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as 
to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, 
                                                            
60 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 451 (1892). 
61 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 893.  
62 Id. at 882.  
63 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 462–64. 
64 Id. at 454.  
65 Id. at 457–58 (emphasis added).  
66 Id. at 454. 
67 Id. at 453. 
68 Id. at 452.  
69 Id. at 462.  
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or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public 
interest in the lands and waters remaining.70 
An alternative rule, the Court concluded, “would place every harbor in the country at the 
mercy of a majority of the legislature of the state in which the harbor is situated.”71 In the 
Court’s judgment,  
The legislation which may be needed one day for the harbor may be 
different from the legislation that may be required at another day. . . [I]t is 
vital to the public welfare that each [legislature] should be able at all times 
to do whatever the varying circumstances and present exigencies attending 
the subject may require; . . . a different result would be fraught with evil.72 
Applying this rule, the Court found that the Act’s grant of submerged lands 
violated the public trust because the conveyance impaired the public interest. The Court 
described the Chicago Harbor as a “common highway[] for commerce, trade, and 
intercourse”73 and recognized its “immense value to the people of the state of Illinois in 
the facilities it affords to its vast and constantly increasing commerce.”74 The Act, 
however, “put it in the power of the [railroad] company to delay indefinitely the 
improvement of the harbor,”75 thus undermining the state’s ability to manage and control 
commercially vital infrastructure in accordance with public necessity, safety, and welfare. 
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT 
In December 2008, the Chicago City Council enacted, and Mayor Richard Daley 
signed, a seventy-five-year contract conveying to Morgan Stanley the exclusive right to 
all revenues derived from the city’s stock of approximately 34,000 on-street metered 
parking spaces and 2000 city-owned garage spaces.76 In return, the city received an 
upfront $1.15 billion payment.77 In enacting the agreement, the council bound the city to 
a predetermined schedule of parking meter rates through 2084,78 obliging subsequent city 
councils to compensate Morgan Stanley for deviations which materially impair investors’ 
expected profits.79 Similarly, the agreement obliges the city to compensate Morgan 
Stanley for any action that reduces investors’ expected profits beyond specified 
thresholds.80 Though the Agreement contains a “Reserved Powers” provision, ostensibly 
                                                            
70 Id. at 453.  
71 Id. at 455.  
72 Id. at 459–60.  
73 Id. at 458–59. 
74 Id. at 454. 
75 Id. at 451.  
76 See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25. 
77 Id. at 50508.  
78 Id. at 50516–18.  
79 See id. at 50549 (indicating that “Reserved Powers” includes the city’s power to “establish and revise 
from time to time the schedule of Metered Parking Fees for the use of Metered Parking Spaces”); see also 
id. at 50621 (requiring the city to compensate Morgan Stanley for exercising its “Reserved Powers”). See 
generally infra Appendix, Use of Reserved Powers.  
80 See infra Appendix, Compensation Event.  
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reserving for the city the right to dictate parking meter prices and remove on-street 
parking spaces, the agreement also contains a “Reserved Powers Adverse Action 
Compensation” provision requiring compensation to Morgan Stanley for any exercise of 
such powers.81 Indeed, according to the concessionaire’s 2010 financial statements, the 
City of Chicago paid Morgan Stanley $533,330 in the first year of the lease for “changes 
to the system . . . which reduce[d] the company’s revenue.”82  
Aldermen voted on the highly technical, 125-page, seventy-year contract only two 
days after Mayor Daley unveiled the proposal.83 The agreement was subject to only about 
one hour of debate and passed by a vote of 40 to 5.84 Alderman Richard Mell admitted 
that he and many of his colleagues did not thoroughly read the agreement: “How many of 
us read the stuff we do get, OK? I try to. I try to. I try to. But being realistic, being 
realistic, it's like getting your insurance policy. It's small print, OK?”85 As one of only 
five aldermen to vote against the agreement, Leslie Hairston explained, "I don't really 
know who we are dealing with. We need answers before we can vote on this."86  
Compounding the inadequacies of the legislative process, the city council began 
immediately appropriating Morgan Stanley’s payment, exhausting in approximately two 
years the “$1.15 billion parking meter windfall that was supposed to last for 75 years.”87 
Significantly, the city council expended these funds not on new capital improvements, 
but merely to plug annual operating deficits.88 In the fall 2010, Fitch ratings agency 
“downgraded Chicago's bond rating, in part because the city had used money from the 
meter-lease to pay for operations.”89  
The City of Chicago inspector general issued an analysis of the parking meter 
privatization in June 2009. “Conservatively,” the report concluded, the city undersold the 
system by $974 million, or approximately half its value.90 The inspector general 
concluded that the city succumbed to “[t]he temptation of entering into [the agreement] in 
order to receive [a] large, upfront payment[] that solve[d] short-term financial problems, 
without properly considering the long-term implications of the deal.”91 Further, the 
inspector general found that the deal was “rushed through the City’s legislative body, 
                                                            
81 See infra Appendix, Use of Reserved Powers. 
82 Chicago Parking Meters, LLC, supra note 25, at 8. 
83 See Mihalopoulos & Dardick, supra note 27.  
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Fran Spielman, $700 MILLION GAP | As City Faces Huge Budget Gap, Just $180 Mil. Left of $1.15 Bil. 
Meter Windfall, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July. 21, 2010, http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/article/reserves-
dwindling-city-faces-700m-budget-gap; see also Fran Spielman, Daley's Final Budget Sails Through the 
City Council, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/2456862-418/mayor-
budget-million-daley-chicago.html [hereinafter Daley’s Final Budget]; Fran Spielman, $587 Million 
Budget Deficit Awaits Rahm Emanuel, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 6, 2011, 
http://www.suntimes.com/news/politics/5222836-418/budget-deficit-awaiting-emanuel-upwards-of-587-
million.html [hereinafter $587 Million Budget Deficit] (noting that Mayor Daley took “a political beating 
for leasing the city's parking meters, downtown parking garages and Chicago Skyway and spending nearly 
all of the money those transactions generated to avoid tax increases in his last two budgets”). 
88 Daley’s Final Budget, supra note 87. 
89 The Big Sell: Other Cities Can Learn from the Outgoing Mayor’s Experiment with Privatisation, 
ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2010, www.economist.com/node/17043320.  
90 See Report of Inspector General, supra note 19, at 2.  
91 Id. 
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with little time to digest and analyze a complicated transaction, with limited information 
provided, and with little opportunity for public input and reaction.”92  
The parking meter privatization has been plagued by accusations of corruption.93 
This suspicion is fomented in part by the inspector general’s report, indicating that the 
city significantly underpriced the asset. Moreover, the beneficiary of the city’s 
mismanagement is Morgan Stanley, for whom Mayor Daley’s nephew serves as a vice 
president and the firm’s Cook County lobbyist.94 According to the Chicago Sun Times, 
William Daley Jr. moved to New York two years ago for a job with 
Morgan Stanley, an investment giant with an appetite for the city of 
Chicago. Within a year, his employer signed a new deal with his uncle, 
Mayor Daley. Morgan Stanley got a 99-year lease to operate the city's four 
underground parking garages. City Hall got an upfront payment of $563 
million—the highest offer made. Morgan Stanley hopes to strike two more 
deals with Mayor Daley. It's among several bidders seeking long-term 
leases to run Midway Airport and oversee 36,161 parking meters.95  
Further contributing to the appearance of impropriety, if not corruption, Morgan Stanley 
prevailed as the preferred vendor in an opaque, nonpublic process.96 Nonetheless, 
evidence of corruption is merely circumstantial.  
Incidentally, no obvious public recourse exists. Mayor Daley, the party primarily 
responsible for the parking meter privatization, chose not to run for reelection, perhaps in 
part because of its unpopularity.97 Moreover, the city cannot simply rescind the contract 
by returning Morgan Stanley’s payment. First, the city has appropriated virtually the 
entire payment.98 Second, the contract specifies damages in excess of funds received, 
namely, “the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest” as determined by an 
independent appraiser.99 This value includes Morgan Stanley’s expected profit, which is 
substantial.100 With no obvious recourse, the inspector general notes that the Agreement 
                                                            
92 Id.  
93 See, e.g., John Kass, Potential Challenger Has Some Frightening Words for Daley, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21, 
2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-08-21/news/ct-met-kass-0822-20100821_1_parking-meter-
deal-street-parking-rates-challenger.  
94 Tim Novak, William Daley Jr., New York Investor, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 1, 2008, at A19.  
95 Id.  
96 Ben Joravsky & Mick Dumke, New Evidence Suggests Chicago Leased Out Its Parking Meters for a 
Fraction of What They’re Worth, CHI. READER, May 21, 2009, www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/one-
billion-dollars/Content?oid=1123046. 
97 Rick Pearson & Hal Dardick, Majority Say No To Daley, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2010, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-18/news/chi-100718daley-poll_1_frequent-daley-critic-record-
seventh-term-half-of-chicago-voters (noting that “[d]issatisfaction abounds . . . over Daley's handling of the 
crime problem, his efforts to rein in government corruption and his backing of a controversial long-term 
parking meter system lease”). Upon retiring, Mayor Daley accepted employment with the law firm retained 
by Chicago to draft the Concession Agreement. Mick Dumke, Daley Joining Law Firm He Previously 
Hired for City's Meter Deal and Other Privatization Work, CHI. READER, June 1, 2011, 
www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2011/06/01/daley-joining-law-firm-he-previously-hired-for-
citys-meter-deal-and-other-privatization-work.  
98 $587 Million Budget Deficit, supra note 87. 
99 J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50543.   
100 Id. Critically, the “fair market value” substantially exceeds the $1.15 billion payment received by the 
city, according to the inspector general. Report of Inspector General, supra note 19, at 3; see also Darrell 
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“give[s] a private company control over a major public asset for three generations . . . 
[with] significant impact on the everyday lives of its citizens.”101 
III. ILLINOIS CENTRAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT  
This Part analyzes the Concession Agreement under the holding of Illinois Central. 
This analysis begins, in subpart III(A), by surveying the development of the public trust 
doctrine, demonstrating its historical application to municipal streets and placing the 
Court’s 1892 Illinois Central opinion in historical context. Subpart III(B) scrutinizes the 
Court’s Illinois Central opinion for evidence of this history, and the Court’s application 
of public trust principles to Chicago’s municipal streets. Subpart III(C) applies the rules 
governing the disposition of public trust property, announced in Illinois Central, to the 
Concession Agreement. 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine and Its Historical Application to Public Streets 
Today, the public trust doctrine generally, and Illinois Central specifically, is 
presumed to apply to environmentally sensitive lakes, rivers and wetlands, not city streets 
and alleys. Nonetheless, from its very inception, through at least the late nineteenth 
century, the public trust doctrine served to protect not only commercially vital 
waterways, but their upland equivalents, municipal streets and highways. This history 
informs Illinois Central and, thus, an understanding of this history is essential to 
understanding the Illinois Central opinion. 
1. Ancient and Early English Conceptions of the Public Trust Doctrine 
Discussions of the history of the public trust doctrine invariably begin with the 
Roman Institutes of Justinian, composed in 528 A.D., which recognized a public right to 
“perpetual use” of “certain common properties . . . such as the seashore, highways, and 
running water.”102 The Code “designated public roads, harbors, rivers and riverbanks as 
res publicae. These objects were considered to be the property of the Roman people 
and . . . were held for the free use of all.”103 As res publicae properties, public roads were 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Preston, A Windfall for Investors, a Loss for Chicago, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 12, 2010, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_34/b4192044579970.htm.   
101 See Report of Inspector General, supra note 19, at 2.  
102 Sax, supra note 4, at 475 (emphasis added). But see James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient 
Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 1–2 (2007) (noting “a 
history of pervasive private ownership in both Rome and England” of state-owned waters and lands); Sax, 
supra note 4, at 475 (acknowledging the lack of a public right in Rome and England to enforce public trust 
protections). For our purposes, however, the relevant question is not the practical effectiveness of these 
ancient doctrines, but rather the degree to which they applied equally under the law to both navigable rivers 
and upland highways.  
103 SELVIN, supra note 3, at 17 (emphasis added). Thomas Sandars, in his definitive translation of the 
Institutes of Justinian, explains the publicus thusly:  
The word publicus is sometimes used as equivalent to communis [i.e., air and seas], but is 
probably used, as here, for what belongs to the people. Things public belong to a 
particular people, but may be used and enjoyed by all men . . . . The particular people or 
nation in whose territory public things lie may permit all the world to make use of them, 
but exercises a special jurisdiction to prevent any one injuring them . . . . [Such 
properties] ‘are subject to the guardianship of the Roman people.’  
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afforded special protection unavailable to agri vectigales, or public lands available for 
lease, and similar state and municipal properties; such properties the state or municipality 
“held exactly like individuals . . . the state or corporate being looked on as any other 
owner.”104 Thus, the Institutes of Justinian, the ancient foundation of the public trust 
doctrine, does not appear to discriminate, in its protection of res publicae property, 
between submerged lands, such as harbors and rivers, and their commercial non-riparian 
counterparts, public roads and highways.  
Early English common law conceptions of the public trust “borrowed” from the 
Institutes of Justinian.105 According to public trust scholar Professor Molly Selvin, 
“Those public trust rights which did exist in the corpus of [early English] common law 
doctrines . . . can be found in the two treatises [De Jure Maris and De Portibus Maris] of 
Sir Matthew Hale,” Chief Justice of the King’s Bench from 1671 until 1675.106 In De 
Jure Maris, Lord Hale described the rudimentary public trust doctrine of early English 
common law, essentially a public easement which applied equally to upland highways 
and navigable rivers. Lord Hale acknowledged that the soil beneath an upland highway or 
a navigable river may, under the early English common law, “in point of property . . . be 
a private man’s freehold.”107 Yet, the fee was subject to a “publick interest,” or right of 
passage, which may not be “prejudiced or damnified.”108 This right of passage, Lord Hale 
concluded, applied equally to upland highways and navigable rivers  
whether fresh or salt, that are a common passage, not only for ships and 
greater vessels, but also for smaller, as barges or boats; . . . for as the 
common highways on the land are for the common land passage, so these 
kind of rivers, whether fresh or salt, that bear boats or barges, are 
highways by water; and as the highways by land are called [a royal high 
road] so these publick rivers for publick passage are called [a royal road 
by water] . . . ; all things of publick safety and convenience being in a 
special manner under the king’s care, supervision, and protection.109 
Interpreting De Jure Maris, Professor Selvin asserts, “As protector of the highways, 
public rivers, and seaports, [only] the king could order the removal of all nuisances or 
obstructions to the common passage in such properties . . . . Royal ownership and 
regulatory responsibilities, then, placed these important resources in a form of public 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN WITH ENGLISH INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION 
AND NOTES 91 (7th ed. 1910). 
104 THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN WITH ENGLISH INTRODUCTION, 
TRANSLATION AND NOTES 160 (Chi., Callaghan & Co., 1st Am. ed. 1876), 
http://www.archive.org/stream/institutesjusti00hammgoog#page/n226/mode/2up.  
105 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 11, at 308 (“Bracton, writing in the mid-thirteenth century, borrowed 
from Justinian’s Institutes and claimed that at common law the sea and seashore were common to all.”). 
106 SELVIN, supra note 3, at 24; see also MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 11, at 309 (stating that “it was 
Hale’s version of English law that served as the starting point for American writers, most notably Joseph 
Angell and James Kent, who presented a vision of English water law as a baseline for introducing the 
American law on the subject”).  
107 STUART MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 405 (3d ed. 1888) 
(reciting DE JURE MARIS).  
108 Id. at 405.  
109 Id. at 374.  
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trust.”110 Thus, the early English common law, as articulated by Lord Hale, mirrored the 
Institutes of Justinian in subjecting not only navigable submerged lands but their upland 
equivalents, the “common highways,” to a form of public trust protection.  
2. Early-Nineteenth Century American Law 
Beginning in the 1840s, half a century before Illinois Central, “state and federal 
courts began to formulate a large body of public trust law.”111 During this period, “Courts 
of the Middle Atlantic [and New England regions which included the country’s largest 
metropolises: New York, Baltimore, Boston, and Philadelphia]112 ruled that the streets of 
their major cities ‘are species of property’ held in trust for the public.”113 The impetus for 
this aggressive assertion of public rights was industrialization; namely, “[a]s railroad and 
shipping improved during the century, control of harbor-front property in particular and 
urban property in general came to mean control of the economic destiny of a particular 
locality.”114 Foreshadowing Illinois Central, “[t]he overwhelming majority of trust 
litigation during the mid-nineteenth century in these states centered around the rights of 
railroads in public streets and tidal property.”115  
Unlike in England, where the soil beneath public streets and navigable streams 
remained “in point of property . . . a private man’s freehold,” early nineteenth century 
states began vesting the title to soil beneath navigable waterways and upland highways in 
public entities, not private landowners.116 In Illinois, for instance, the legislature enacted 
the “Plat Act,” vesting municipal streets, alleys, and ways “in the corporate name thereof 
in trust . . . .”117 While affirming public ownership of soils beneath tidal lands and city 
                                                            
110 SELVIN, supra note 3, at 25–26. 
111 Id. at 63.  
112 See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION OF THE 90 URBAN PLACES: 1830, 
www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab06.txt.  
113 SELVIN, supra note 3, at 108. 
114 Id. at 102.  
115 Id. at 106. 
116 Id. at 107–21.  
117 Plat Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/3 (West 2010) (emphasis added). The Act remains virtually 
identical to the Act as amended in 1845. Today, the Act reads, “[T]he premises intended for any street, 
alley, way, common or other public use in any city, village or town, or addition thereto, shall be held in the 
corporate name thereof in trust to and for the uses and purposes set forth or intended.” Id. In 1845, the Act 
read, “And the land intended to be for streets, alleys, ways, common or other public uses, in any town or 
city, or addition thereto, shall be held in the corporate name thereof, in trust to, and for the uses and 
purposes set forth and expressed or intended.” Plat Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 25 (1845), available at 
http://www.archive.org/stream/revisedstatuteso00illi#page/n11/mode/2up. 
During the early and mid-nineteenth century, the Illinois Supreme Court consistently affirmed the 
public trust obligation the Plat Act imposed on municipalities. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Haven, 11 Ill. 554 
(1850) (“A proprietor of land, who lays out the same, under our statute, into town or city lots, vests the 
legal title to the land embraced by streets, in the corporation of the town or city, for the use and benefit of 
the public. It is a solemn dedication of the ground to the [municipal] corporation, to be held in trust for the 
uses and purposes of the public.”) (emphasis added); City v. Ill. Transp. Co., 12 Ill. 37, 59 (1850) 
("Whatever title to these public grounds may be vested in the city, she has not the unqualified control and 
disposition of them. They were dedicated to the public for particular purposes, and only for such purposes 
can they be rightfully used. For these purposes the city may improve and control them, and adopt all 
needful rules and regulations for their management and use, but she can not alien[ate] or otherwise dispose 
of them. At most, she but holds them in trust for the benefit of the public . . . . This is not like the case of 
property purchased by the city for her own exclusive use, which she could dispose of at her pleasure.”); see 
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streets, mid-nineteenth century courts sanctioned the right of the state, as sovereign, to 
appropriate such properties as consistent with the states’ trust obligations. Indeed, during 
this period, states’ rights to dispose of public trust property, including tidal property118 
and public streets,119 were “almost unqualifiable,” “inalienable,” “absolute” and 
“despotic.”120 The supreme court of Pennsylvania, for instance, claimed the fee to the soil 
beneath all state highways, including every “navigable stream, which is a public 
highway,” but declared that this enviable inventory of trust resources were ‘subject to 
[the State’s] absolute discretion and control’. . . over which she holds despotic sway, the 
remedy for an abuse of [this power] being a change of rulers and a consequent change of 
the law.”121 In this manner, the early nineteenth century courts validated  
extraordinary legislative grants of privilege to semi-public corporations, 
most specifically the railroad and turnpike companies. Those privileges 
stemmed from the basic judicial determination that the operation of 
railroad and turnpikes on city streets, piers, and public highways was 
consistent with the public trust under which the state legislatures and 
municipal corporations held those properties.122 
Nonetheless, courts occasionally invalidated such privileges when conveyed by 
municipalities, which lacked a state’s “despotic” sovereign power. In Milhau v. Sharp, 
for instance, the plaintiffs challenged a grant by New York City for the construction and 
operation of a private passenger railway on Broadway Avenue.123 The New York 
supreme court, in an opinion upheld by the New York Court of Appeals,124 concluded 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
also City of Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231 (1875). Nonetheless, mid-nineteenth century Illinois jurists, like 
their New England and Mid-Atlantic contemporaries, embraced the economic potential of the iron horse 
and thus found the appropriation of public streets for railroad purposes consistent with public trust 
principles. See Stack v. E. St. Louis, 85 Ill. 377, 379–80 (1877). 
118 In In re N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 77 N.Y. 248 (1879), a factual dispute similar to Illinois 
Central, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a state grant of submerged lands beneath New York 
Harbor to a railroad corporation. Admitting the land beneath New York Harbor “is held in trust, [and] . . . 
cannot be appropriated for any purposes inconsistent with such use and rights of the public in the waters,” 
the court nonetheless concluded, “such rights are [not] invaded by an appropriation for the purposes now 
claimed.” Id. at 259. 
119 Courts during this period overwhelmingly sanctioned the use of railroads on city streets as consistent 
with the public trust in which such property was held. In the most prominent Supreme Court opinion on this 
question during the mid-nineteenth century, Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876), the Supreme 
Court acknowledged, “public authorities ought to have entire control of the great passageways of 
commerce and navigation, to be exercised for the public advantage and convenience.” Id. at 338. 
Nonetheless, the Court concluded a state grant to several railroad corporations to operate on the streets of 
Keokuk, Iowa, which necessitated partially filling the Mississippi River, did not violate this principle. 
“Though attended with some inconveniences,” the Court admitted, “[railroads] have greatly added to the 
efficiency of the public thoroughfares, and have more than doubled their capacity for travel and 
transportation.” Id. at 341. Significantly, however, the Court mandated the removal of a freight depot, 
constructed “under the contract with the city,” id. at 329, because the structure “was a total obstruction of 
the passage,” and was thus “subversive of, and totally repugnant to, the dedication of the street, as well as 
to the rights of the public.” Id. at 342. 
120 See SELVIN, supra note 3, at 116–17.  
121 Phila. & Trenton R.R. Co., 6 Whart. 25 (Pa. 1840).  
122 SELVIN, supra note 3, at 12. 
123 Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193 (N.Y. 1853). 
124 Davis v. Mayor of N.Y., 14 N.Y. 506, 522 (1856).  
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that the city exceeded its authority by conveying public trust property to a private 
corporation for nominal consideration, specifically, “a trifling sum, with the right to 
demand five cents fare from travelers, when the trustees might have obtained a million of 
[sic] dollars for the grant, with a charge upon travelers of only three cents.”125 The court 
wrote: 
[The city council] is the depositary of a trust which it is bound to 
administer faithfully, honestly and justly. And no one will content that the 
body of men, who for the time being, may be its duly authorized 
representatives, can legally dispose of its property of great value, without 
any or for a nominal consideration; and if they shall presume to do so, it 
will be no excuse for such a gross and unwarrantable breach of trust to say 
that they acted in their legislative capacity; for the very simple reason that 
they will not act in that capacity.126  
The concession at issue in Milhau was the right to lay track on Broadway Avenue. 
The city argued that the license represented merely “permission” to use the street, without 
granting an exclusive right of possession.127 The court questioned this distinction, but 
ultimately dismissed the relevance of the “character” of the grant:  
[I]t is immaterial what particular name is given to this thing which is thus 
granted. Whether it be a thing corporeal or incorporeal, or whatever be its 
correct legal designation, it is a species of property of some kind. It is a 
property held by the city, and is subject to the same trusts and duties as its 
other [trust] property.128 
Similarly, in Quincy v. Jones the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a city may not 
grant a non-possessory right “to the lateral support of the soil in [a] street.”129 Invoking 
the Plat Act, the court reasoned: 
It is the unquestioned duty of the city, in controlling and improving the 
streets, to prepare them for public use, as streets, at such time and in such 
manner as the public necessities may require. Holding them in trust for the 
public, and having no authority to convey or divert them to other uses, it 
                                                            
125 Milhau, 15 Barb. at 198 (summarizing the argument of the plaintiff, with whom the court ultimately 
sided).  
126 Id. at 212. Foreshadowing Illinois Central, in which the Court reasoned, “The position advanced by the 
railroad company . . . would place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a majority of the legislature 
of the State in which the harbor is situated,” 146 U.S. at 455, the New York supreme court, half a century 
earlier, warned, “If a different doctrine were established, the mayor and aldermen of the city of New-York 
might, at the next meeting of the common council, distribute the whole of the property owned by the city 
among themselves, provided that they adhered to the ordinary forms of legislation.” Milhau, 15 Barb. at 
213.  
127 Milhau, 15 Barb. at 202, 206. In support of this position, the city argued, “Every precaution was taken to 
prevent the rails from being felt by any vehicle passing in the street. . . . [T]he safety, health, comfort and 
convenience of the public were carefully attended to . . . Nor would the cars interfere with the ordinary use 
of the street for other vehicles.” Id. at 202.  
128 Id. at 214.  
129 76 Ill. 231, 244 (1875). 
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would seem inevitably to follow that they can have no power to grant to 
individuals rights or easements in the street which might in any way 
interfere with the duty of preparing them for public use to meet the public 
necessities; for it is obvious that if such rights may be granted, then the 
practical use of the streets may become so burdened with private rights as 
to place it beyond the pecuniary ability of the city to discharge its duty to 
the public, with reference to them.130 
3. Late Nineteenth-Century American Law 
By the late nineteenth century, courts began to question states’ “proclivity toward 
the privatization of trust resources,”131 a sentiment “coincident with the prevailing 
popular hostilities toward railroad corporations.”132 As A Treatise on the Law of Roads 
and Streets—published in 1890, two years prior to Court’s Illinois Central opinion—
lamented: 
It is, in truth, somewhat difficult to vindicate the doctrine that private 
corporations may use the streets of a city for their own benefit . . . . It is 
true, as history proves, that municipalities are quick to grant important 
privileges without restriction which they subsequently feel the necessity of 
limiting, but not until after it is too late, and it is undeniably true that 
courts have not been entirely free from the same general influence which 
moved the local bodies.133 
In the late nineteenth century, state supreme courts, and the United States Supreme 
Court, began to invalidate legislative appropriations of public trust property. Prior to the 
Supreme Court’s Illinois Central opinion, state supreme courts in New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana invoked public trust principles to rescind legislative 
grants for the construction and operation of elevated, for-profit railroads on public 
streets.134 For instance, in New York’s so-called Elevated Rail Cases, consisting of Story 
v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co. and Lahr v. Metro. Elevated Ry. Co., the plaintiffs challenged 
the legislature’s authority to grant a private corporation the right to construct and operate 
an “El,” or elevated railroad, on the streets of New York.135 The New York Court of 
Appeals, in language foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s Illinois Central opinion,136 
found “[t]he legislature . . . had no power to authorize the street to be used for an elevated 
steam railroad.”137 While acknowledging “travel on the surface of the street would . . . 
                                                            
130 Id. at 242–43.  
131 See SELVIN, supra note 3, at 147.  
132 Id. at 303.  
133 BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS 559–60 
(1890).  
134 See, e.g., Story v. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co. 90 N.Y. 122 (1882); Lahr v. Metro. Elevated Ry. Co., 104 
N.Y. 268 (1887); Pa. R.R. Co. v. Miller, 132 U.S. 75, 82 (1889); Jones v. Erie & Wyo. Valley R.R. Co., 
151 Pa. 30 (1892); Griffin v. Shreveport & Ark. R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 808 (La. 1889); Costigan v. Pa. R.R. 
Co., 54 N.J.L. 233 (N.J. 1892). See generally SELVIN, supra note 3, at 305–13.  
135 See Story, 90 N.Y. at 122; Lahr, 104 N.Y. at 268. 
136 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“A grant of all the lands under the 
navigable waters of a state has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power.”) (emphasis added).  
137 See Lahr, 104 N.Y. at 296.  
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still be possible,”138 the grant authorized the “permanent appropriation of the street for 
railroad purposes, . . . a perversion of its use.”139  
Pursuant to the Act of 1813, comparable to the Illinois Plat Act, New York 
municipalities hold title to city streets “in trust.”140 The court construed the trust as a 
“contract written in the statute.”141 Thus, the legislature could not reappropriate public 
streets by the mere exercise of legislative discretion.142 The United States Supreme Court 
“explicitly affirmed”143 this principle.144 Applying New York law, the Court found: 
The logical effect of [the Elevated Rail Cases] is to construe the 
Constitution as to operate as a restriction upon the legislative power over 
the public streets . . . and confine its exercise to such legislation as shall 
authorize their use for street purposes alone. The trust upon which streets 
are held is that they shall be devoted to the uses of public travel. When 
they, or a substantial part of them, are turned over to the exclusive use of a 
single person or corporation, we see no reason why a state court may not 
hold that it is a perversion of their legitimate uses, [and] a violation of the 
trust . . . .145 
The consequences of the Elevated Railroad decisions were immense. In the wake 
of the Story decision, the New York City “El” system, operational for approximately 
three years, effectively ceased to function,146 generating an enormous capital loss for its 
private investors. Moreover, the Story and Lahr decisions reverberated throughout late 
nineteenth-century courts. The supreme courts of Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and New 
Jersey subsequently imposed similar restrictions on the operation of elevated railroads.147 
In addition, the success of plaintiffs in challenging elevated railroads as a violation of the 
public trust motivated certain courts to reconsider their earlier enthusiasm for 
accommodating surface railroads on public streets.148  
As a consequence of such decisions, by the 1890s, public streets, like state and 
municipal harbors, were deemed public trust property and accorded protection under the 
public trust doctrine. In 1897, the American & English Encyclopedia of Law announced, 
as a general principle of law not specific to any particular state, “Municipal corporations 
hold the title to streets, alleys, public squares, wharves, etc., in trust for the public; and 
upon principle, such trust property can no more be disposed of by the corporation than 
                                                            
138 See Story, 90 N.Y. at 155. 
139 Lahr, 104 N.Y at 288, 294.  
140 Id. at 268. 
141 See Story, 90 N.Y. at 177. 
142 Id.  
143 See SELVIN, supra note 3, at 310.  
144 See Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 547, 554 (1907). 
145 Id.  
146 See SELVIN, supra note 3, at 309–10. 
147 Id at 25.  
148 See SELVIN, supra note 3, at 315. Unlike the New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Louisiana 
courts, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to distinguish between surface and elevated lines, and thus found 
the latter consistent with Chicago’s public trust obligations. See Summerfield v. Chicago, 197 Ill. 270, 282 
(1902). Critically, however, the court concluded the city council’s “object was not to grant the railroad 
company additional privileges in the streets, but to secure the[ir] elevation . . . in the interest of the safety 
of the public . . . and to increase the[ir] facility [for] passage . . . .” Id. at 285 (emphasis added).   
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can any other trust property held by an individual.”149 Even in the absence of a specific 
statute qualifying the rights of state and municipal authorities, as in New York and 
Illinois, common law served to restrain their discretion by directly “vest[ing] the title in 
trust for the public.”150 
B. Evidence of this History in Illinois Central 
Within the context of this extensive case and statutory history, the Illinois Central 
Court composed its opinion. The question thus arises: does the opinion evidence this 
history? An analysis of the opinion suggests the Court contemplated application of the 
public trust doctrine beyond submerged lands to “streets, alleys [and] ways” in Illinois.  
To begin, commentators have attempted, generally unsuccessfully, to apply the 
holding of Illinois Central beyond submerged lands to upland natural resources, such as 
forests. Revealingly, the Court itself specifically rejects this interpretation, 
[Title to lands beneath navigable waters] is a title different in character 
from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale. It is different 
from the title which the United States hold in the public lands which are 
open to preemption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the 
State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce 
                                                            
149 See Municipal Corporations, in 1 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 949, 1064 (John 
Houston Merrill ed., 1891).  
150 See ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 133, at 91. This discussion is intended to place the Illinois Central 
opinion in historical context, and thus terminates in the late nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, 
courts expanded the public trust doctrine to encompass environmentally sensitive resources, while 
generally ignoring, without specifically rejecting, its application to public streets. For instance, in the most 
significant Supreme Court public trust decision of the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court 
expanded the doctrine to encompass all lands under waters “subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,” 
regardless of whether such waters are navigable. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988). 
Phillips, thus, significantly expanded the doctrine, without rejecting its earlier applications. It is worth 
noting that the Supreme Court, in so-called “public forum doctrine” decisions, continues to state that public 
streets are held in public trust. See Hauge v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“[w]herever 
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public”); 
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (noting that “all public streets are held in the public trust”); 
Int’l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (noting that “all public streets are held in 
the public trust”). See generally Karl P. Baker & Dwight H. Merriam, Indelible Public Interests in 
Property: The Public Trust and the Public Forum, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 275 (2005) (“While these 
doctrines stand on distinct historical and theoretical foundations and diverge from each other in many 
respects, there are important parallels between them in how they conceptualize the relationship between 
government’s power to regulate, control, and dispose of land it owns, and the rights belonging to what one 
scholar has called the ‘unorganized public’ in that same property.”). As will be discussed in Part IV, Illinois 
continues to apply public trust principles to non-submerged municipal property, including public streets 
and parks. See, e.g., id. at 286 (“Illinois is one of the few states to have judicially expanded the public trust 
doctrine to public parks.”). Unlike Illinois, the Iowa Supreme Court has specifically rejected the application 
of the public trust doctrine to public streets. See Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 814 (Iowa 
2000) (“We think these underpinnings of the public trust doctrine have no applicability to public streets and 
alleys. Simply stated, an alley is not a natural resource.”). In specifically rejecting application of the 
doctrine to public streets, Iowa is an exception. Moreover, unlike Illinois’s code, Iowa’s code does not 
contain a Plat Act vesting title to municipal streets in public trust. Iowa Code § 354.19 (2011), titled 
“Dedication of Land,” merely provides for “public access” to streets, whereas Illinois’s code requires that 
title to soil beneath municipal streets be placed in public trust.  
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over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or 
interference of private parties.151 
While Illinois Central is self-evidently not applicable to upland natural resources, it is 
equally self-evident the Court contemplated application of its holding beyond submerged 
lands. 
First, the Court referred to public trust property broadly, not narrowly in reference 
only to submerged lands. The Court wrote, for instance, “The State can no more abdicate 
its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and 
soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private 
parties . . .”152 Similarly, the Court wrote, “So with trusts connected with public property, 
or property of a special character, like lands under navigable water, they cannot be 
placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the State.”153 Such passages suggest 
the Court perceived the soil beneath navigable waters as but one example of “property of 
a special character” or “trust property in which the whole people are interested.”154 While 
Justice Field refused to catalog all public trust property, an exercise unnecessary for the 
disposition of the case, such language suggests the Court intended, or at least 
contemplated, application of its rule to “public [trust] property” of which submerged land 
was but one, common-law example.155  
In fact, the Court specifically cited the Illinois Plat Act as an example of non-
submerged public trust property. “By a statute of Illinois,” the Court wrote, “the making, 
acknowledging and recording of the plats operated to vest the title to the streets, alleys, 
ways and commons, and other public grounds designated on such plats, in the city [of 
Chicago], in trust for the public uses to which they were applicable.”156 This discussion is 
remarkable for two related reasons. First, the Court explicitly acknowledged the existence 
of non-submerged public trust property, namely “streets, alleys [and] ways” in Illinois. 
Second, the statutory command contained in the Plat Act, and recited by the Court, is 
virtually identical to the Court’s description of the common-law public trust in 
submerged lands. Whereas the Court ruled that submerged land is held, under the 
common law, “in trust . . . for the public uses, for which it is adapted,”157 the Plat Act 
states that streets, alleys and ways are held “in trust for the public uses to which they 
were applicable.”158 Presumably, the Court consciously employed this parallel 
construction between the statute and the common-law right, suggesting the two public 
trusts, as conceived by the Court, were essentially equivalent.159 
                                                            
151 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
152 Id. at 452–53 (emphasis added).  
153 Id. at 454.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 462. 
157 Id. at 457–58.  
158 Id. at 462 (paraphrasing the Plat Act).  
159 The question thus arises: Why did the Court not merely cite the Plat Act to rescind the harbor grant, as 
opposed to invoking an expansive, ill-defined common-law principle? Quite simply, the Plat Act does not 
extend to wharves, harbors or other submerged property. See Plat Act, 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/3 (West 
2010). Thus, one could construe the Court’s opinion as effectively expanding upon the Plat Act, by 
invoking virtually identical language to bring under public trust protection the state’s interests in the 
submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor.  
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Second, Illinois Central’s references to navigable waters as “natural highways”160 
and “common highways for commerce, trade and intercourse”161 further suggests the 
Court believed public trust principles applied to non-submerged highways. Indeed, the 
Court explicitly relied on Lord Hale’s conception of the public trust, one conceived, as 
earlier discussed, on the analogy between navigable waters and upland highways, and on 
the assumption, under early English law, all such properties were subject to the King’s 
protection.162 The Court wrote: 
In his treatise on De Jure Maris, Lord Hale says: The jus privatum that is 
acquired by the subject, either by patent or prescription, must not 
prejudice the jus publicum, wherewith public rivers and the arms of the 
seas are affected to public use; . . . The principle of the common law to 
which we have adverted is founded upon the most obvious principles of 
public policy. The sea and navigable rivers are natural highways, and 
injury to them is injury to commerce . . . .163  
Thus, “the most obvious principles of public policy” dictated that the trust 
encompass not only aquatic, but upland, highways. This was precisely the effect of the 
Plat Act, for “[t]he word ‘highway,’” according to Angell and Durfee’s 1886 A Treatise 
on the Highways, “is considered as the genus of all public ways; So that a common street 
in any city or town, being common to all people, is a public highway.”164 
Finally, an earlier Supreme Court opinion suggests that Justice Field believed the 
public trust doctrine extended beyond submerged lands.165 In Townsend v. Greeley, 
authored by Justice Field, the Court held that certain non-submerged, non-tidal lands, 
formerly under Mexican authority, were subject to public trust protection; the Court thus 
imposed restrictions on their alienability. Paraphrasing Field’s opinion, Professor Selvin 
writes, 
“It is therefore now the settled law,” he wrote, that the land thus held by 
pueblos’ towns under the Mexican government were not held by the them 
in absolute property but in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants and 
were held subject to a similar trust by municipal bodies which have 
succeed to the possession of such property.166 
In conclusion, while the Illinois Central holding is not applicable to upland natural 
resources, the rules announced by the Court apply broadly to public trust property, not 
merely to navigable submerged land. While the Court was unwilling to inventory all such 
property, Justice Field’s opinion identified the Plat Act, and thus “streets, alleys [and] 
ways” in Illinois, as an example of non-submerged public trust land. Justice Field 
                                                            
160 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 458.  
161 Id.  
162 See SELVIN, supra note 3, at 25.  
163 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 458.  
164 Joseph K. Angell & Thomas Durfee, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS 19 (1886) (emphasis 
original).  
165 Townsend v. Greeley, 72 U.S. 326, 377 (1866). 
166 SELVIN, supra note 3, at 214. 
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specifically cited the Act, consciously copied the Act, and implicitly endorsed the Act by 
invoking “the most obvious principles of public policy.”  
C. Application of Illinois Central’s Holding to the Concession Agreement 
Assuming Justice Field intended, or at least anticipated, application of the Court’s 
holding beyond submerged lands to “streets, alleys, [and] ways” in Illinois, the question 
arises whether a temporary, non-possessory, lease—which does not impede the public’s 
right of passage—violates the rules announced by the Court. As discussed in subpart 
I(B), the Court prohibited a state from “placi[ng]” public trust property “beyond the 
direction and control of the State,” unless the conveyance served the public interest.167 
Applying this rule, the Court found that “[t]he harbor of Chicago is of immense value to 
the people of the State of Illinois in the facilities is affords to its vast and constantly 
increasing commerce.”168 The Court thus rejected the idea that “placing [it] in the hands 
of a private corporation created for a different purpose” served the public interest.169 
Interpreting this rule, Professors Merrill and Kearny argue, “What [Justice Field] opposed 
was what he imagined to be the conferral of a monopoly over the Chicago harbor on a 
private corporation,” allowing it to engage in “rent-seeking” behavior and “delay 
indefinitely the development of the harbor.”170 
On the surface, conveying a non-possessory lease of on-street parking meter 
infrastructure may not appear to implicate such concerns. Ensuring on-street parking, 
unlike promoting economic development, is not an essential governmental obligation. 
Indeed, private parking lots dot Chicago; such lots undoubtedly promote, not impair, 
commerce. Upon inspection, however, the Concession Agreement mirrors the Lake Front 
Act in encouraging the stagnation of publicly owned infrastructure essential to Chicago’s 
economic and urban development, precisely the concerns invoked by Justice Field. 
Specifically, the Concession Agreement effectively eliminates the city’s ability to 
substantially redesign, redevelop, or reallocate on-street parking for three generations 
because “any [such] action at any time” triggers an Adverse Action Concession 
Compensation Payment equal to Morgan Stanley’s expected, unrealized, and substantial 
profit.171 A seventy-five-year commitment to maintaining 36,000 on-street public parking 
spaces represents a significant impairment of the city’s ability to develop as future 
generations and technological advances demand—to add bus-only or bicycle lanes, build 
streetcars, expand the “El” system, extend sidewalks, improve landscaping, or create 
pedestrian markets or thoroughfares by closing streets to traffic. Morgan Stanley’s 
position is thus, quintessentially, one of a rent-seeker. The company is specifically 
prohibited by the Concession Agreement from improving the public rights-of-way, other 
than installing systems to facilitate the collection of revenues. Yet, the city cannot 
improve the public rights-of-way or, as Justice Field writes, “do whatever the varying 
circumstances and present exigencies attending the subject may require,” without 
                                                            
167 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 454. 
168 Id. 
169 See also id. at 452–54. 
170 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 924; Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 451.  
171 See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50619; see also text accompanying supra 
notes 71–72 and 89–90.  
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compensating Morgan Stanley.172 The Agreement thus allows a for-profit corporation, 
one “created for a different purpose” and obligated to maximize shareholder returns, the 
right to “delay indefinitely the improvement” of publicly owned infrastructure essential 
to the general welfare, a result in Justice Field’s judgment “fraught with evil.”173 
As one example of the redevelopment of municipal rights-of-way, New York City 
recently installed over 200 miles of bicycle lanes on city streets “much of them created 
by eliminating parking.”174 And a little over a year ago the city closed Broadway to 
vehicle traffic in Times Square and Herald Square, transforming New York's two busiest 
shopping and entertainment plazas into pedestrian malls.175 Critically, the benefits of 
such transportation reforms are not merely aesthetic. As a consequence of New York’s 
reforms, “Pedestrian fatalities from collisions with cars are down 19 percent from 2001. 
Bicycle fatalities are down 54 percent, despite a tripling of the number of bikes on the 
road since that year.”176 In fact, in the past two years, “Fewer people have been killed in 
traffic accidents on New York’s streets than at any time in the past century, according to 
city records.”177 New York, of course, is not alone. Seattle is eliminating on-street 
parking spaces to extend its streetcar network.178 Oakland is proposing to eliminate on-
street parking to create a rapid bus transit system.179 The Concession Agreement 
represents a significant, if not insurmountable, impediment to such redevelopment of 
Chicago’s public rights-of-way, “substantial[ly] impair[ing]” the public interest. 
The city may argue, reasonably, that the Concession Agreement is distinguishable 
from the Lake Front Act. Foremost, the city retains title to the property, whereas the Lake 
Front Act conveyed title in fee simple. Upon inspection, however, this distinction proves 
irrelevant. In determining whether the Lake Front Act relinquished “management and 
practical[] control” of a public trust asset, the Court dismissed the mere legal form of a 
conveyance as immaterial and specifically rejected the distinction between a long-term 
lease and a conveyance in fee.180 As discussed in subpart I(A), in enacting the Lake Front 
Act the legislature sought to protect the public interest by prohibiting the railroad from 
conveying its ownership in the harbor. Dismissing the significance of this supposed 
prohibition, Justice Field wrote, “The inhibition against the technical transfer of the fee of 
                                                            
172 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 459.  
173 Id.  
174 Nathanial Gronewold, Pedestrians, Bicyclists Spar for Space in NYC's New No-Car Zones, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/08/08greenwire-pedestrians-bicyclists-spar-for-
space-in-nycs-n-3563.html. 
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 Michael M. Grynbaum, For City’s Transportation Chief, Kudos and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2011, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/nyregion/06sadikkhan.html?tntemail1=y&_r=1&emc=tnt&pagewanted=all. 
178 Seattle Dept. of Transp., Environmental Checklist First Hill Streetcar, 
http://www.seattlestreetcar.org/about/docs/sepa/First%20Hill%20Streetcar%20SEPA%20Checklist.pdf 
(“[T]he streetcar project would eliminate approximately 48-51 percent of the on-street parking spaces 
along the proposed alignment . . . [or] between 265 and 279 existing parking spaces.”).  
179 City of Oakland Transp. Serv. Div., East Bay Bus Rapid Transit (EBBRT) Project 
Design Concept for Study, 
http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/ceda/docs/h10_why_bike_lanes_with_brt_draft.pdf (proposing to 
eliminate between 254 and 387 on-street parking spaces along Telegraph Avenue to establish a bus rapid 
transit system). 
180 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 451 (1892).  
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any portion of the submerged lands was of little consequence when it could make a lease 
for any period and renew it at its pleasure.”181 Applying Field’s reasoning, any 
prohibition on the alienation of public trust property is “of little consequence” when a 
state may subvert it by “mak[ing] a lease for any period and renew[ing] it at its pleasure.” 
Additionally, the city may argue Morgan Stanley lacks an exclusive right of 
possession, and is specifically prohibited from obstructing the public rights-of-way.182 
Again, under the Court’s Illinois Central analysis, merely ensuring unimpeded public 
passage is not sufficient to validate a conveyance of public trust property. Justice Field 
acknowledged, for instance, that “[the railroad’s] works in no respect interfered with any 
useful freedom in the use of the waters of the lake for commerce, foreign, interstate or 
domestic.”183 Likewise, the dissent noted that “[t]he Lake Front Act had prohibited the 
railroad from interfering with the public right of navigation and had preserved the power 
of the State to regulate the railroad’s construction of improvements in the harbor.”184 
Thus, Justice Field is not concerned merely with physically obstructing the channels of 
commerce. Rather, his concern is the more subtle, and profound, impact of allowing 
grants of private privilege in vital public infrastructure to retard the city’s continued 
economic development. Thus, under Illinois Central, the differences in mere form 
between the two conveyances are insufficient to render the Concession Agreement a valid 
exercise of legislative authority. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT 
LITIGATION 
Part III sought to demonstrate the Illinois Central Court considered “streets, alleys, 
[and] ways” in Illinois as statutorily defined public trust property, subject to the 
prohibitions governing the conveyance of navigable submerged lands. The question 
arises, however, whether this interpretation of a century-old opinion is remotely relevant 
in any meaningful, practical way. To this end, Part IV applies a public trust analysis to 
the Concession Agreement, utilizing operative Illinois Supreme Court precedent. This 
analysis introduces a theory, and accompanying case law, unexplored by the parties and 
court in the current litigation.185   
                                                            
181 Id.  
182 Incidentally, this is exactly what the public trust language embedded in the Concession Agreement, 
supra note 25 at 50576, is designed to accomplish—protection of the public right of passage. As 
demonstrated by Illinois Central, however, such minimal protections are not sufficient to render a 
conveyance of public trust property valid.  
183 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 147 U.S. at 444.  
184 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 921. 
185 Indeed, neither the plaintiff nor the court has introduced the Plat Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/3 (West 
2010), AT&T Co. v. Arlington Heights, 620 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. 1993), or Section 3.19 of the Concession 
Agreement, J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50576. See Plaintiff’s First Amended 
Complaint, Indep. Voters of Ill. v. Lux, 09-CH-28993 (Cook Cnty. Ct. filed Aug. 19, 2009); Plaintiff’s 
Second Amended Complaint, Indep. Voters of Ill. v. Lux, 09-CH-28993 (Cook Cnty. Ct. filed Aug. 19, 
2009); Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, Indep. Voters of Ill. v. Lux, 09-CH-28993 (Cook Cnty. Ct. 
filed Aug. 19, 2009); Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
Indep. Voters of Ill. v. Lux, 09-CH-28993 (Cook Cnty. Ct. filed Aug. 19, 2009); Plaintiff’s Memorandum 
of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Indep. 
Voters of Ill. v. Lux, 09-CH-28993 (Cook Cnty. Ct. filed Aug. 19, 2009). During the hearing on the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the trial judge noted,  
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To begin, the public trust doctrine self-evidently governs the Concession 
Agreement. Specifically, Section 3.19 of the Concession Agreement reads,  
The City agrees, and the Concessionaire acknowledges and accepts, that 
the City holds and administers the public way in trust under the public 
trust doctrine . . . . In the administration of its public trust with respect to 
the public way, the City will not take any action in contradiction of the 
public trust doctrine . . . .186  
Should the City attempt to argue this contractual provision is superseded or otherwise 
inoperative, the Agreement further states, “To the extent that any ordinance, resolution, 
rule, order, or provision of the Municipal Code, or part thereof, is in conflict with the 
provisions of this ordinance, the provisions of this ordinance shall be controlling.”187  
This contractual provision is consistent with the state Plat Act, discussed in Illinois 
Central. The Plat Act remains substantively identical to the Act as amended in 1845188 
and currently reads, “[T]he premises intended for any street, alley, way, common or other 
public use in any city, village or town, or addition thereto, shall be held in the corporate 
name thereof in trust to and for the uses and purposes set forth or intended.”189 
In subpart II(A), the Note introduced Quincy v. Jones, a mid-nineteenth-century 
Plat Act decision prohibiting a municipality from burdening a public street with private 
rights to the detriment of the public.190 Throughout the twentieth century, however, the 
Illinois Supreme Court continued to strictly construe the Plat Act. For instance, in 1923, 
in Chicago v. Chicago Century Railroad Company, the court refused to recognize the 
validity of a contractual provision entitling a railroad to compensation when a 
municipality demanded the company relocate its tracks.191 An alternative rule, the court 
concluded, “might forever prevent improvements and development in particular streets 
and would thereby determine [the municipality’s] growth.” Requiring compensation 
would “seriously interfere[]” with the “duty of the city to protect the public in its use of 
the streets, and from time to time, as the community develops, to keep the streets in such 
condition as will accommodate public safety and convenience.”192  
The court affirmed this position in 1953 in Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company v. 
Chicago. In a similar factual dispute, the court refused to require the City of Chicago to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Although the First Amended Complaint contains certain general allegations challenging 
the Concession Agreement, Plaintiffs explain in their Response and further elaborated 
during this Hearing that the, quote, main issue here is whether the City’s expenditure of 
public funds to pay police to issue parking tickets against and boot vehicles that belong to 
people who have unpaid private debts owed to a private company [sic], close quote.  
Report of the Proceedings at 62, Indep. Voters of Ill. v. Lux, 09-CH-28993 (Cook Cnty. Ct. filed Aug. 19, 
2009). 
186 J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 50576. The authors of the Concession 
Agreement, while recognizing the relevance of the public trust doctrine, seem to assume merely ensuring 
public passage satisfies the city’s trust obligations. As discussed in Part II and further explored in Part IV 
this assumption is contradicted by precedent. 
187 Id. at 50525. 
188 See Plat Act, supra note 117. 
189 Id.  
190 See Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231 (1875). 
191 Chicago v. Chi. Cent. Ry. Co., 324 Ill. 618, 623 (1926). 
192 Id. at 623. 
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compensate a utility for the cost of relocating its sub-street infrastructure, rejecting the 
utility’s claim of a contractual right to payment.193 The court reasoned, 
If the city could not change the grade or the width of its street except upon 
condition that it make compensation to the railway company, the gas 
company, the water company, the telephone company, the electric light 
company and other companies occupying the streets under a contract with 
the city, for inconvenience and expense thereby occasioned, the duty of 
the city to protect the public in its use of the streets, and from time to time, 
as the community develops, to keep the streets in such condition as will 
accommodate the public safety and convenience, would be seriously 
interfered with. All corporations thus occupying the streets take their 
grants from the city upon condition that the city has reserved to it the full 
and unconditional power to make any reasonable change of grade or other 
improvement in its streets as the public necessity and convenience 
demand.194  
In a 1993 opinion, Arlington Heights v. AT&T, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed 
the public trust principles underlying Peoples Gas.195 In rejecting the efforts of two 
home-rule municipalities to profit by “rent[ing]” or “leas[ing]” land beneath city streets 
to a telecommunications provider, at prices in excess of the municipalities’ “actual costs,” 
the majority held: 
Municipalities do not possess proprietary powers over the public 
streets. They only possess regulatory powers. The public streets are held in 
trust for the use of the public. While numerous powers and rights 
regarding public streets have been granted to municipalities by the General 
Assembly, they are all regulatory in character, and do not grant any 
authority to rent or to lease parts, or all, of a public street. 
. . . .  
. . . The streets exist for the benefit of the entire public and are 
subject only to reasonable regulations regarding usage. Streets do not exist 
and were not created as either obstructions or revenue-producing property 
for municipalities.196 
                                                            
193 Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Chi., 413 Ill. 457 (1953).  
194 Id. at 465.  
195 AT&T Co. v. Arlington Heights, 156 Ill. 2d 399, 409 (Ill. 1993) (emphasis added); id. at 414 (emphasis 
added). 
196 Id. at 409 (emphasis added). Though the rule announced in Arlington Heights is directly on-point, the 
facts underlying the decision are not. In Arlington Heights, numerous municipalities threatened to charge 
AT&T potentially inflated prices for laying cable beneath their streets, rendering such infrastructure 
improvements prohibitively expensive. Thus, Arlington Heights invoked statewide, and not merely intra-
city, concerns. It is worth noting, however, that the supreme court in Peoples Gas stated:  
[A municipality] holds [its streets] in trust for the people of the entire State. So far as 
their use for street purposes is concerned, every citizen of the State has an equal right. 
This right of the people in the streets and highways of the state, whether inside or outside 
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Arlington Height’s prohibition on the exercise of “proprietary power” is 
particularly revealing because the Illinois Central Court invoked precisely this language. 
Specifically, Justice Field concluded, “The bed of Lake Michigan . . . [is] not held by the 
State in any proprietary or private right”; rather, the character of the trust is 
“governmental.”197 This suggests Arlington Heights incorporated public trust principles 
originally derived from Illinois Central into its rules governing the regulation of public 
streets. 
Applying the Arlington Heights test, the inquiry becomes: Is the municipality’s 
action affecting its public streets a “reasonable regulation regarding public usage,” an 
exercise of its governmental power, or is the action intended primarily to produce 
revenue, an exercise of “proprietary power”? Here, simply asking the question suggests 
the answer. The entire purpose of the Concession Agreement was to monetize the 
revenue streams produced by a particularly lucrative asset—one chosen specifically for 
its appeal to investors—thus impairing the ability of subsequent councils to exercise 
“governmental powers” and impose “reasonable regulations,” in accordance with public 
necessity, safety, and convenience.  
In the pending litigation, the city relies extensively, if not exclusively, on the 
expansive powers provided “home-rule” municipalities by a 1970 amendment to the 
Illinois constitution.198 This amendment grants cities such as Chicago “[the] power to 
perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited 
to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and 
welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.”199 Moreover, the Constitution instructs 
courts to “construe[] [such powers] liberally.”200 On the strength of this argument the city 
won a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim that “The Concession Agreement Illegally 
Leases the City’s Parking Meter System on Public Streets.”201 The city cited in defense of 
this position, and the trial court adopted as the basis for its decision, a 1989 Illinois 
Supreme Court opinion, Triple A Services v. Rice, which held that “[h]ome rule units 
have the same powers as the sovereign, except where such powers are limited by the 
general assembly.”202 Thus, the Rice court concluded, “Chicago draws its power to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the municipalities thereof, is a paramount right. The municipality cannot lawfully 
perform any acts itself nor permit others to do or perform anything in derogation of this 
right of the sovereign people . . . . 
Peoples Gas, 413 Ill. at 464.  
197 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 444 (1892). 
198 Indeed, the Concession Agreement itself states:  
This ordinance is an exercise of the City's power as a home rule unit of local government 
under Article VII of the 1970 Constitution of the State of Illinois and is intended to 
override any conflicting provision of any Illinois statute that does not specifically 
preempt the exercise of home rule power by the City. 
J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL., supra note 25, at 50526.  
199 ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).  
200 Id. at § 6(m). 
201 See First Amended Complaint at 5, Indep. Voters of Ill. v. Lux, No. 09CH-28993 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 
2009).  
202 Triple A Services v. Rice, 131 Ill. 2d 217, 230 (1989); see also Report of the Proceedings at 62, Indep. 
Voters of Ill. v. Lux, 09-CH-28993 (Cook Cnty. Ct. filed Aug. 19, 2009) (dismissing the plaintiffs claim 
because “[h]ome rule units have the authority to contract . . . . [and] [t]he matter of parking and the 
regulation of the City streets are within home rule powers and functions”).  
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‘regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare’ directly from 
the constitution.”203  
The city’s and court’s reliance on the 1970 constitution, however, is misplaced. 
First, Arlington Heights, a 1993 opinion, specifically stated that home-rule municipalities 
lack proprietary powers over public streets, including the power to “rent or to lease parts, 
or all, of a public street.” To the extent that the court’s 1989 Triple A and 1993 Arlington 
Heights opinions conflict, the latter presumably prevails. Notwithstanding Arlington 
Heights, the city’s reliance on the 1970 constitution fails. Admittedly, under its home-
rule authority, Chicago enjoys “the same powers as the sovereign.” Illinois Central, 
however, specifically imposed limits on the power of the sovereign to alienate public 
trust resources. Indeed, substituting the City of Chicago for the State of Illinois in this 
context only reinforces the applicability of Illinois Central to the litigation. The city 
cannot rely on the home-rule provisions of the state constitution for authority to alienate 
public trust resources just as the Illinois legislature could not rely on its supposedly 
despotic sovereign power to alienate the submerged lands of the Chicago Harbor. 
Finally, Plat Act-related decisions, including Arlington Heights, represent but one 
facet of Illinois public trust jurisprudence.204 Assuming Chicago’s municipal streets are 
accorded “public trust doctrine” protection, as explicitly stated in the Concession 
Agreement, a broader survey of Illinois public trust caselaw is appropriate. Relying on 
Supreme Court precedent, including Illinois Central, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
implicitly adopted a test for determining whether a grant of public trust property violates 
the public trust doctrine. Under the state doctrine, granting rights in such property is not, 
per se, impermissible. Rather, the court inquires into whether the grant primarily benefits 
the general public or a private party. If the latter, the grant violates the doctrine.205 This 
                                                            
203 See Triple A Services, 131 Ill. 2d at 230. 
204 Illinois courts have interpreted the public trusts articulated in Illinois Central and the Plat Act as 
complementary, if not identical. See Mamolella v. First Bank of Oak Park, 97 Ill. App. 3d 579, 582–83 
(1981) (noting “[t]he Supreme Court [in Illinois Central] also observed that the title to these navigable 
waters was different in character from the State’s title to other public lands, and that, unlike ordinary land 
that the State held for sale, the navigable waterways were held in an inalienable public trust. There can be 
no doubt that the Chicago lakefront has great value to the people of the State of Illinois. Similarly, the 
public has a strong interest in the preservation of public parks.”); see also Paepcke v. Public Building Com. 
263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970) (applying Illinois Central to public parks under the Plat Act). In this manner, 
courts have applied the rules articulated in Illinois Central to the disposition of public trust property under 
the Plat Act.  
205 See People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 80 (1976) (rejecting State’s attempt to transfer 
certain submerged lands to U.S. Steel Corporation and noting “In order to preserve meaning and vitality in 
the public trust doctrine . . . the public purpose to be served cannot be only incidental and remote. . . . [T]he 
direct and dominating purpose here would be a private one.”); Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 203 
Ill. 2d 312, 328 (2003) (upholding the City Park District’s thirty-year lease of Soldier Field to the Chicago 
Bears organization and noting “that Soldier Field will continue to be used as a stadium for athletic, artistic, 
and cultural events. With improved parking, the public will gain better access to the stadium, the museums, 
and the lakefront generally. The public will now enjoy a fully renovated, multiuse stadium, instead of a 
deteriorating 78 year-old facility. These results do not violate the public trust doctrine even though the 
Bears will also benefit from the completed project.”); Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
742 F.Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (rejecting transfer of submerged lands in Lake Michigan to Loyola 
University although “some aspects are beneficial to the public, the primary purpose of the grant is to satisfy 
a private interest.”); People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 157 (1896) (upholding transfer of 
certain submerged lands to private parties to fund construction of Lake Shore Drive because the public’s 
interest in the lands and waters remaining was not impaired); see also Lake Mich. Fed’n, 742 F. Supp. at 
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fact-intensive inquiry is similar to the test undertaken in Illinois Central; indeed, it is 
undoubtedly derived from Illinois Central where Justice Field wrote, “The control of the 
State for the purposes of the [public] trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as 
are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without 
any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining."206  
The Illinois Central test is admittedly subjective. Here, however, the benefit inures 
to the private entity, not the general public. The public benefit consists of a cash infusion 
of $1.15 billion207 and modest annual savings associated with transferring revenue 
collections and system maintenance. This funding allowed the city to delay significant 
budget cuts or tax increases for approximately two years,208 an obvious benefit to 
Chicago’s citizens and employees. This public benefit, however, must be contrasted with 
the public cost. In sum, the city received “half the value” of the concession rights,209 
parking rates immediately quadrupled on two-thirds of the city’s meters,210 and the city 
sacrificed the right to regulate its streets as public safety, necessity and welfare demand, 
without compensating Morgan Stanley for any profits thus impaired.211 On the whole, the 
public benefit is marginal.  
Conversely, the Agreement is a boon for private investors. According to 
Businessweek: 
Chicago drivers will pay a Morgan Stanley-led partnership at least $11.6 
billion to park at city meters over the next 75 years—10 times what Mayor 
Richard Daley received when he leased the system for a one-time sum of 
$1.15 billion in 2008. The investors . . . may earn a profit of $9.58 billion 
before interest, taxes, and depreciation, according to documents for the 
group's $500 million private note sale. Helped along by some aggressive 
parking-fee hikes, the group is making a profit (before earnings, taxes, and 
depreciation) equivalent to 80 cents per dollar of projected revenue. 
Standard Parking, a publicly traded company that runs the parking 
concession at the city's O'Hare and Midway airports, earned only 4.84 
cents per dollar of revenue last year.212 
Accordingly, the public is marginally benefitted, if at all, while Morgan Stanley extracts a 
“windfall.” The Concession Agreement thus violates the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
contemporary public trust doctrine test. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
444 (“The court [in Kirk] found that the transfer did not violate the public trust doctrine because . . . the 
project would directly benefit the public.”).  
206 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).  
207 See J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 25 at 50508.  
208 See supra note 87. 
209 See Report of Inspector General, supra note 19, at 2. 
210 Dan Mihalopoulos, Parking Meter Fees to Quadruple, CHI. BREAKING NEWS (Dec. 2, 2008), 
http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2008/12/parking-meter-fees-to-quadruple.html. 
211 See discussion supra Part II, par. 1–3.  
212 Preston, supra note 100. 
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CONCLUSION 
Private investors are increasingly seeking monopolistic property rights in publicly 
owned infrastructure. The monopoly sought by such institutions consists not of an 
exclusive possessory right, but of an “exclusive right and franchise” to revenues derived 
from the asset. This phenomenon recalls the efforts of nineteenth-century railroad 
corporations to acquire special privileges in public streets and harbors, conveyences 
which ostensibly protected the public interest by ensurining continued public access to 
the encumbered asset. In the “lodestar” of the modern public trust doctrine, Illinois 
Central, the Supreme Court prevented a railroad corporation from acquiring monopolistic 
property rights in a “common highway for commerce, trade and intercourse,” despite the 
public’s continued right of passage over the property.213 The grant, in the Court’s 
judgment, empowered a private party indifferent to public safety and welfare to engage in 
profit-maximizing, rent-seeking behavior and thus “delay indefinitely the improvement” 
of essential public infrastructure. The recent Chicago Parking Meter Concession 
Agreement invokes precisely such concerns. By allocating to Morgan Stanley an 
exclusive, monopolistic right to revenues derived from the parking meter system, and 
requiring the city to pay substantial premiums for the right to exercise regulatory powers 
in accordance with public necessity, the Concession Agreement encourages the 
stagnation of publicly owned infrastructure vital to Chicago’s economic and urban 
development. To this end, Illinois Central specifically, and the public trust doctrine 
generally, maintain tremendous potential to proscribe infrastructure privatizations which 


























                                                            
213 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892).  
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APPENDIX  
Selected Concession Agreement Provisions 
An "Adverse Action" shall occur if the City, the County of Cook or the State of Illinois 
(or any subdivision or agency of any of the foregoing) takes any action or actions at any 
time during the Term (including enacting any Law) and the effect of such action or 
actions, individually or in the aggregate, is reasonably expected (i) to be principally borne 
by the Concessionaire or other operators of on-street metered parking systems and (ii) to 
have a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest 
(whether as a result of decreased revenues, increased expenses or both), except where 
such action is in response to any act or omission on the part of the Concessionaire that is 
illegal (other than an act or omission rendered illegal by virtue of the Adverse Action) or 
such action is otherwise permitted under this Agreement; provided, however, that none of 
the following shall be an Adverse Action: (A) any action taken by the City pursuant to its 
Reserved Powers, (B) other than as a result of any action taken by the City pursuant to its 
Reserved Powers, the development, redevelopment, construction, maintenance, 
modification or change in the operation of any existing or new parking facility or mode 
of parking or of transportation (including a road, street or highway) whether or not it 
results in the reduction of Metered Parking Revenues or in the number of vehicles using 
the Metered Parking System, (C) the imposition of a Tax of general application or an 
increase in Taxes of general application, including parking Taxes of general application 
imposed on customers or operators of parking facilities, or (D) requirements generally 
applicable to public parking lot licensees including "public garage-not enclosed" 
licensees under the Municipal Code. (b) If an Adverse Action occurs, the Concessionaire 
shall have the right to (i) be paid by the City the Concession Compensation with respect 
thereto (such Concession Compensation, the "AA-Compensation") or (ii) terminate this 
Agreement and be paid by the City the Metered Parking System Concession Value, in 
either case by giving notice in the manner described in Section 14.1(c).214 
 
* * * 
 
Compensation Event. “Compensation Event” means the Concessionaire’s compliance 
with or the implementation of any City Directive or any modified or changed Operating 
Standard subject to Section 6.3(b), the occurrence of an Adverse Action or the occurrence 
of any other event that under the terms of this Agreement explicitly requires the payment 
of Concession Compensation . . . . ‘Concession Compensation’ means compensation 
payable by the City to the Concessionaire in order to restore the Concessionaire to same 
economic position the Concessionaire would have enjoyed if the applicable 
Compensation Event had not occurred, which compensation shall be equal to the sum of 
(i) all Losses (including increased operating, financing, capital and maintenance costs but 
excluding any costs and expenses that the Concessionaire would otherwise expend or 
incur in order to comply with this Agreement or in the ordinary course of the 
performance of the Metered Parking System Operations or the carrying on of business in 
the ordinary course) that are reasonably attributable to such Compensation Event plus (ii) 
                                                            
214 J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CITY COUNCIL,  supra note 25 at 50619. 
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the actual and estimated net losses (after giving effect, to the extent applicable, to any 
increase in revenues, including Metered Parking Revenues that are attributable to such 
Compensation Event) of the Concessionaire’s present and future Metered Parking 
Revenues that are reasonably attributable to such Compensation Event; provided, 
however, that, unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, any claim for Concession 
Compensation shall be made within 120 Days of the date that the Concessionaire first 
became aware of such Compensation Event. Any Concession Compensation payable with 
respect to Losses or lost Metered Parking Revenues (or other revenues) that will occur in 
the future shall be payable at the time such Compensation Event occurs based on a 
reasonable determination of the net present value of the impact of such Compensation 
Event (i) over the period ending on February 28, 2015 in the case of the Compensation 
Event described in Section 7.1 and (ii) over the remainder of the Term in the case of any 
other Compensation Event.215 
 
* * * 
 
Required Closure Allowance. “Required Closure Allowance” means (i) with respect to a 
particular Concession Metered Parking Space located within the Central Business District 
and a particular Reporting Year, eight percent (8%) of the number of Days during such 
Reporting Year that such Concession Metered Parking Space was a designated 
Concession Metered Parking Space for Metered Parking System Operations, and (ii) with 
respect to a particular Concession Metered Parking Space not located within the Central 
Business District and a particular Reporting Year, four percent (4%) of the number of 
Days during such Reporting Year that such Concession Metered Parking Space was a 
designated Concession Metered Parking Space for Metered Parking System Operations 
and in either case based upon the assumption that such Concession Metered Parking 
Space will continue to be a Concession Metered Parking Space for the remainder of such 
Reporting Year.216 
 
* * * 
 
Required Closure Payment. “Required Closure Payment” means, with respect to a 
Concession Metered Parking Space and for the Quarter during which the Required 
Closure Allowance for the Reporting Year is first exceeded and for each subsequent 
Quarter during the Reporting Year, an amount of money equal to twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the weighted average Revenue Value of such Concession Metered Parking 
Space during the Reporting Year multiplied by a fraction the numerator of which is the 
number of Days in such Quarter that such Concession Metered Parking Space was closed 
as a result of a Required Closure after the date the Required Closure Allowance for such 
Reporting Year was fully applied and the denominator of which is the number of Days 
that such Concession Metered Parking Space was so designated during such Quarter as a 
Concession Metered Parking Space for Metered Parking System Operations, all based 
upon the assumption that such Concession Metered Parking Space will continue to be a 
                                                            
215 Id. at 50533 (emphasis in original). 
216 Id. at 50548. 
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Concession Metered Parking Space with its then current Revenue Value for the 
remainder of such Reporting Year.217 
 
* * * 
 
Reserved Powers. “Reserved Powers” means the exercise by the City of those police and 
regulatory powers with respect to Metered Parking Spaces, including Concession 
Metered Parking Spaces and Reserve Metered Parking Spaces, and the regulation of 
traffic, traffic control and the use of the public way including the exclusive and reserved 
rights of the City to (i) designate the number and location of Metered Parking Spaces and 
to add and remove Metered Parking Spaces; (ii) establish and revise from time to time the 
schedule of Metered Parking Fees for the use of Metered Parking Spaces; (iii) establish 
and revise from time to time the Periods of Operation and Periods of Stay of Metered 
Parking Spaces;' (iv) establish a schedule of fines for parking violations; (v) administer a 
system for the adjudication and enforcement of parking violations and the collection of 
parking violation fines and (vi) establish and administer peak period pricing, congestion 
pricing or other similar plans.218 
 
* * * 
 
Use of Reserved Powers. The Parties acknowledge and agree that (i) it is anticipated that 
the City will exercise its Reserved Powers during the Term, (ii) the impact of certain of 
such actions may have a material adverse effect on the fair market value of the 
Concessionaire Interest; (iii) the provisions of Article 7, including the provisions thereof 
relating to the payment of Settlement Amounts by the City, are designed to compensate 
the Concessionaire for changes resulting from the exercise by the City of its Reserved 
Powers in a manner that will maintain the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest 
over the Term and (iv) adverse changes may be mitigated by other Reserved Power 
actions of the City that will have a favorable impact on the fair market value of the 
Concessionaire Interest. The Parties also acknowledge and agree that there may be 
circumstances when the exercise by the City of its Reserved Powers may have a material 
adverse effect on the fair market value of the Concessionaire Interest that cannot be 
compensated fully under the provisions of Article 7 and that under such circumstances 
the Concessionaire may seek compensation with respect thereto (the ‘Reserved Powers 
Adverse Action Compensation’).219 
                                                            
217 Id. at 50549. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 50621. 
